-- ============================================================================
-- 🛡️ ROCHESTON ZELC PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE
-- 👤 Creator: Haja Mo
-- 🏢 Organization: Rocheston
-- 📜 Platform: Rocheston Agentic AI Cybersecurity Automation Platform
-- ============================================================================

-- Playbook: Google Cloud Supply Chain Defense (GCP Keywords)
-- Intent: Demonstrates 'securitycommandcenter', 'gke', 'artifactregistry', and 'bigquery'. 
-- Responds to a tainted container image and enforces organizational guardrails.
-- Infrastructure: Google Cloud Global, SCC, GKE, BigQuery, Chronicle.
-- Note: 'folder' level policies are used to provide inheritance-based security.

package soc.gcp_native_ops
use gcloud, gke, storage, bigquery, slack, rosecoin

-- ============================================================================
-- 1. CONFIGURATION GOVERNORS (Strongly Typed)
-- ============================================================================
⚙️ keep TARGET_ORG: organization = "rocheston-global-2026"
⚙️ keep SECURE_FOLDER: folder = "production-workloads"
⚙️ keep VULN_THRESHOLD: String = "CRITICAL"

-- ============================================================================
-- 2. THE ENTRY POINT (The Check Block)
-- ============================================================================
🔥 check GCPNativeSupplyChainDefense
  
  -- Trigger Gate: Security Command Center detects a 'Vulnerability: High' in a production image
  ⚠️ when gcp_scc_finding_detected
    
    🔹 set finding_id: String = event.finding_name
    🔹 set image_path: String = event.resource_data.image_uri
    🔹 set project_id: String = event.project_id
    
    🚨 alert critical message "GCP THREAT: SCC Finding {finding_id} in Artifact Registry. Tainted image: {image_path}."

    -- ============================================================================
    -- 3. THE KINETIC ISOLATION (gke, artifactregistry, compute)
    -- ============================================================================
    ⚡ do
      
      -- Action 1: Quarantine the image in Artifact Registry by removing 'Pull' permissions
      -- Voice-friendly: "GCP restrict registry..."
      ☁️ gcloud artifactregistry restrict_access image_path to "Security-Admins-Only"
      
      -- Action 2: Use GKE Binary Authorization to block any NEW pods from this image
      ☁️ gke binary_authorization set_policy "Block-Tainted-Images" for project_id
      
      -- Action 3: Identify running pods using the tainted image across the Folder
      -- Voice-friendly: "GKE list vulnerable pods..."
      🔹 set active_pods: Array = gke pods list where image == image_path in SECURE_FOLDER
      
      ⚠️ if active_pods.length > 0
         🚨 alert warning message "ACTIVE THREAT: {active_pods.length} pods currently running the tainted image. Initiating drain."
         ☁️ gke pods delete active_pods --grace_period 30
      🔴 end

      -- ============================================================================
      -- 4. THE DATA & FORENSIC LAYER (bigquery, cloudlogging, cloudmonitoring)
      -- ============================================================================
      -- Action 4: Run a BigQuery analysis on CloudLogging to see if the image was exploited
      -- Voice-friendly: "BigQuery forensic audit..."
      🔹 set forensic_query: String = "SELECT * FROM `{project_id}.global._Default` WHERE jsonPayload.image = '{image_path}'"
      🔹 set audit_results: Object = bigquery query forensic_query
      
      -- Action 5: Set a CloudMonitoring Alert for any process spikes on affected Compute nodes
      ☁️ gcloud cloudmonitoring create_alert "High-CPU-Post-Infection" for project_id

      -- ============================================================================
      -- 5. THE IDENTITY & SECRETS LAYER (secretmanager, organization)
      -- ============================================================================
      -- Action 6: Rotate the Service Account keys associated with the GKE nodes
      ☁️ gcloud secretmanager rotate_secret "gke-node-sa-key"
      
      -- Action 7: Enforce a new Org-Policy to prevent 'External IP' on all Compute Engine instances
      ☁️ gcloud organization set_policy "constraints/compute.vmExternalIpAccess" to "DENY" for TARGET_ORG

      -- Action 8: Notify the GCP Platform Team via Slack
      📡 notify slack channel "#gcp-security-command" message "🟢 *GCP Supply Chain Interdicted* \n*Project:* `{project_id}` \n*Image:* `{image_path}` \n*Status:* Registry Locked. Pods Drained. BigQuery Audit Complete. \n*Org-Policy:* External IP access DENIED."

      -- ============================================================================
      -- 6. EVIDENCE & PROOF
      -- ============================================================================
      📝 evidence record "GCP_Native_Remediation_Cycle" details {
          image: image_path,
          scc_finding: finding_id,
          pods_impacted: active_pods.length,
          action: "GOOGLE_CLOUD_NATIVE_CONTAINMENT_SUCCESS"
      }
      
      -- Anchor the SCC finding hash and the BigQuery audit log to Rosecoin
      ⛓️ rosecoin anchor evidence_pack "latest"
      
    🔴 end
  🔴 end
🔴 end